Under income-differentiated mortality, poverty measures reflect not only the "true" poverty, but, also, the interferences or noise caused by the survival process at work. Such interferences lead to the Mortality Paradox: the worse the survival conditions of the poor are, the lower the measured poverty is. We examine several solutions to avoid that paradox. We identify conditions under which the extension, by means of a fictitious income, of lifetime income profiles of the prematurely dead neutralizes the noise due to differential mortality. Then, to account not only for the "missing" poor, but, also, for the "hidden" poverty (premature death), we use, as a fictitious income, the welfare-neutral income, making indifferent between life continuation and death. The robustness of poverty measures to the extension technique is illustrated with regional Belgian data.
Introduction
In An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), Malthus emphasized that the population is a social product, whose size adjusts to the prevalence of poverty through two kinds of population "checks". On the birth side, poverty reduces fertility through parental anticipations about future di¢ culties to raise children (i.e. "preventive checks"). Moreover, poverty leads to premature deaths within the low income classes (i.e. "positive checks").
Given the underdeveloped state of social statistics at Malthus's time, the existence of population checks was more a conjecture than a scienti…c result. However, in the recent years, empirical studies con…rmed the existence of positive population checks, under the form of a relationship between income and life expectancy.
1 On average, individuals with higher incomes have, ceteris paribus, a longer life than individuals with lower incomes. Income-di¤erentiated mortality raises a twofold challenge for the measurement of poverty. Actually, the two aspects of poverty measurement underlined by Sen (1976) are a¤ected: on the one hand, the identi…cation of the poor within the population; on the other hand, the construction of an index aggregating and weighting the information available on the identi…ed poor.
Regarding the identi…cation of the poor, income-di¤erentiated mortality leads to a paradox. Poor persons tend to die, on average, earlier than non-poor persons. Hence, usual poverty measures, which focus on living individuals, do not count the "missing" poor, and, thus, re ‡ect not only the "true" poverty, but, also, the interferences or noise due to income-di¤erentiated mortality. Those interferences push towards a lower poverty estimate. As a consequence, poverty measures tend to underestimate the "true" poverty. 3 That problem can be called the Mortality Paradox: the worse the survival conditions faced by the poor are, the lower the measured poverty is. That result is paradoxical, since poverty measures should be increasing -or, at least, non-decreasing -in the premature mortality faced by the poor due to their low income.
Income-di¤erentiated mortality raises also an important challenge regarding the treatment of the informational basis relevant for the measurement of poverty. Undoubtedly, a shorter life is a major source of deprivation. Hence, if individuals with lower incomes face also a higher mortality, it is hard to ignore this when measuring poverty. But if one takes premature death as a part of the poverty phenomenon to be measured, then a major issue concerns the weighting of the two dimensions under study: income and longevity. This paper focuses on the challenges raised by income-di¤erentiated mortality for the measurement of poverty, by re-examining the Mortality Paradox and its solutions. For that purpose, we …rst develop a 2-period model with income mobility and income-di¤erentiated mortality, and study the conditions under which standard poverty rates face the Mortality Paradox. We propose a solution to it: the extension, by means of a …ctitious income, of lifetime income pro…les of the prematurely dead. Then, we argue that a natural candidate for the …ctitious income is the welfare-neutral income, i.e. the income making an agent indi¤erent between further life with that income and death. Finally, we use Belgian data to estimate the bias induced by the Mortality Paradox, and to evaluate the robustness of adjusted poverty measures to the extension of income pro…les. This allows us to decompose the adjustment into counting the "missing" persons and valuing premature death as a part of poverty.
At this stage, it is important to relate our paper to the existing literature on poverty measurement. As far as we know, there exists only one paper, by Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007) , which proposed a solution to the Mortality Paradox. They recommend, when computing poverty measures, to count the prematurely dead poor persons as if they were still alive, and to truncate their lifetime income pro…les by means of a …ctitious income depending on past incomes. Our paper complements that contribution on three grounds. Firstly, whereas Kanbur and Mukherjee propose general rules for the selection of a …ctitious income, we argue, on the contrary, that the …ctitious income should be equal to a particular level: the welfare-neutral income. Secondly, while Kanbur and Mukherjee only truncate the income pro…les among the poor population, we propose to do it for all "missing" persons. Thirdly, whereas Kanbur and Mukherjee's paper is purely theoretical, we provide empirical estimates of the size of the bias induced by the Mortality Paradox, as well as an empirical study of the robustness of adjusted old-age poverty measures to the extension technique used.
Anticipating on our results, we …rst show how, under income-di¤erentiated mortality, standard old-age poverty rates are subject to the Mortality Paradox. We show that, when a …ctitious income lower than the poverty line is assigned to prematurely dead poor individuals only, the adjusted poverty rate exhibits some form of independence with respect to variations in survival conditions. Then, we consider the construction of alternative adjusted poverty measures, which count a premature death as an aspect of deprivation and poverty. Such measures, instead of being invariant to a worsening of survival conditions, are increasing with the strength of positive population checks. That alternative solution to the Mortality Paradox consists of assigning, to all prematurely dead persons, a …ctitious income equal to the welfare-neutral income. Finally, we show, on the basis of Belgian regional data, that, while the addition of the "missing" persons with …ctitious incomes equal to the incomes when being alive only raises the poverty rates by about one point, the assignment of a …ctitious income equal to the welfare-neutral income raises poverty rates by 6-7 points. Taking the "hidden" burden of premature death into account is a much bigger correction than merely counting the "missing" poor.
Let us close this introduction with two additional remarks. First, there exist numerous circumstances where one can talk of "missing" individuals. A well-known case is the one of missing women in countries where parents get rid of their daughters through abortion or infanticide (Sen 1998) . Another well-documented case is the one of missing cohorts in case of war, famine or epidemic. The case considered in this paper -missing elderly individuals due to income-di¤erentiated mortality -is thus one case among many others. In all those cases, it would be interesting to carry out some thought experiment, to characterize the hypothetical world in which all those missing persons would be alive. This is what we do in this paper, where we study what old-age poverty measures become once the missing elderly are taken into account. Second, even if the present work focuses on standard poverty rates, it cannot be overemphasized that the measurement problem that we consider here is quite general, and concerns all existing poverty measures, including the multidimensional poverty measures taking life expectancy statistics into account. The reason is the following. All poverty measures, including the multidimensional ones, are concerned with the assignment of some number to an economic situation characterized by a particular distribution of some attributes among a population (e.g. income, longevity, etc.). As a consequence, the de…nition of the relevant population -in particular whether we include, in that population, the prematurely dead persons or not -is a general issue, which concerns all poverty measures.
4 Thus multidimensional measures taking longevity into account do not avoid the di¢ culties that are studied in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the measurement of poverty in a model with income mobility and income-di¤erentiated mortality, and identi…es conditions under which truncating income pro…les of the prematurely dead prevents the Mortality Paradox. Section 3 explores a particular extension, which relies on the welfare-neutral income. Section 4 illustrates, on the basis of regional Belgian data, the Mortality Paradox and the robustness of poverty measures to the extension method. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2 Poverty measure and income-based mortality
The framework
Let us consider a two-period model, where a cohort, of size N 2 N, lives the young age (…rst period) for sure, whereas only some fraction of the population will enjoy the old age (second period).
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There exists a …nite number K 2 N of possible income levels (K > 1). The set of possible income levels is: Y = fy 1 ; :::; y K g. For the ease of presentation, we assume that income levels are indexed in an increasing order, so that:
The number of young individuals with income y i 2 Y is denoted by n 1 i . 6 We denote by n 1 the vector of size K, whose entries are n 1 k for k = 1; :::; K. The probability of survival to the old age, denoted by , depends on the income when being young. Following the literature, we assume that a higher income when being young leads to higher survival chances.
7 Hence income-speci…c survival probabilities, which take K distinct values, are ranked as follows:
We denote by the vector of size K whose entries are the income-speci…c survival probabilities k , for k = 1; :::; K. The number of surviving old individuals 4 For instance, the Human Poverty Index (UNDP 1997), which includes, as dimensions, the probability of not surviving to ages 40 or 60, faces the Mortality Paradox, since poor persons who survive until 60 years and then die will not be counted as poor after their death, so that a poverty-related death reduces the poverty measure.
5 Our argument is robust to the number of life-periods. We focus here on a two-period framework to simplify the presentation without unnecessary material.
6 By construction, we have: Duleep (1986) , Deaton and Paxson (1998) , Jusiot (2003) and Salm (2007). with income y i 2 Y is denoted by n 2 i . 8 We denote by n 2 the vector of size K, whose entries are n 2 k for k = 1; :::; K. Denoting by ij the probability that a young agent with income y i enjoys, in case of survival, an income y j at the old age, the income mobility can be described, conditionally on survival, by the right stochastic matrix : :::
The income mobility matrix concerns individuals who live the two periods. As such, this does not take premature death into account, and, thus, leads to an incomplete representation of the dynamics of income distribution.
Actually, the dynamics of income distribution can be represented by means of the transition matrix M, of size K K, which describes how the income distribution at the young age determines the income distribution at the old age:
The transition matrix M is: :::
The M matrix fully describes the trajectories of individuals in our economy. The lifecycle trajectory depends on survival probabilities and on income transition probabilities, which are correlated in terms of rank. We can easily decompose the matrix M into its two components: the income mobility component and the survival process component:
where 1 0 K , 1 K being the identity vector of size K, while the symbol refers to the Hadamard product, that is, the entrywise product of two matrices.
The M matrix includes, as a special case, the situation where there is no premature death (i.e. i = 1 for all i). In that case, the matrix M vanishes to the income mobility matrix . Alternatively, if there is no mobility over the lifecycle (i.e. ii = 1 for all i), the matrix M is a diagonal matrix with survival probabilities i as entries.
The Mortality Paradox
The Mortality Paradox is a general problem faced by various types of poverty measures. It refers to an undesirable sensitivity of poverty measures to incomedi¤erentiated mortality. That paradox can be stated as follows: the worse the survival conditions faced by the poor are, the lower the measured poverty is.
The origin of that paradox has to do with the selection mechanism that is at work under income-di¤erentiated mortality. Survival laws act as a selection 8 By construction, we have:
process: poor individuals die, on average, earlier than non-poor persons. This implies that poor persons become, with the mere passage of time, relatively less numerous than non-poor persons, yielding a lower measured poverty. That result is paradoxical, since the measured poverty should not decrease because of the mere existence of positive population checks. Actually, income-di¤erentiated mortality can be regarded as creating some interferences or a noise preventing the measurement of the "true" poverty.
To illustrate the Mortality Paradox, let us focus on the simplest measures of poverty, i.e. head-count ratios, which measure poverty by counting the number of individuals whose incomes are below a (…xed) poverty threshold y P 2 Y .
De…nition 1 Assume an economy with income distribution n i at age i = 1; 2. If y P 2 Y is the poverty threshold, the poverty rate at age i is:
The old-age poverty rate P 2 is subject to the Mortality Paradox. To see this, let us consider the following example. In a …rst situation n 1 ; ; , individuals who are poor at the young age survive to the old age with positive probabilities 0 < k < 1 for k < P , and there is no income mobility (i.e. jj = 1 for all j). In the second situation n 10 ; 0 ; , individuals who are poor at the young age do not survive to the old age: 0 k = 0 for k < P , and there is no income mobility (i.e. jj = 1 for all j). Writing the old-age poverty rate as:
we obtain the following two measures of poverty, denoted by P 2 for the …rst situation and by P 20 for the second one:
The old-age poverty rate is larger in the …rst situation than in the second one. The reason has nothing to do with the level of poverty at the young age, which could take any possible value; nor does it have anything to do with mobility (which is absent in the two situations); nor does it have anything to do with a change in the poverty threshold y P , which is supposed to be the same in the two situations under study. 9 Actually, the lower level of measured poverty at the old age in the second situation is the mere outcome of income-di¤erentiated mortality. The strong positive population checks at work in the second situation have made old-age poverty vanish to -apparently -nothing.
The fact that a more severe income-based mortality reduces the measured poverty is paradoxical. Poverty indexes should show us the extent of poverty, and not be disturbed by the noise due to income-based mortality. Hence the Mortality Paradox invites a re…nement of poverty measures.
To avoid that paradox, one solution consists of imposing that poverty measures exhibit some independence with respect to survival conditions. The following property, entitled Robustness to Mortality Changes, captures that intuition.
9 See Section 4 on the impact of varying the poverty line on the measurement of poverty.
Condition 1 (Robustness to Mortality Changes) A poverty measure P i satis…es Robustness to Mortality Changes if and only if a deterioration of the survival conditions of some group leaves the measured poverty unchanged:
Robustness to Mortality Changes requires poverty measures to be invariant to a deterioration of survival conditions. That property requires to observe the impact of a change in survival conditions on the poverty measure. A weaker independence requirement is the following. 
No Mobility Same Poverty states that, if we consider an economy without income mobility, the poverty rate should be constant across the lifecycle. That condition is simpler than the Robustness to Mortality Changes, since it focuses on the basic case of no income mobility. However, despite its simplicity, that property is extremely useful, since it has a simple logical relationship with the Robustness to Mortality Changes property, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1
Robustness to Mortality Changes =) No Mobility Same Poverty.
No Mobility Same Poverty + No income mobility =) Robustness to Mortality Changes.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The Robustness to Mortality Changes and the No Mobility Same Poverty conditions are not equivalent. It is only under the special case of no income mobility that a strict equivalence holds. In some sense, we can say that No Mobility Same Poverty is a weaker requirement than Robustness to Mortality Changes, since it is a weaker way to formalize the idea of independence of poverty measures from survival conditions.
The above lemma is useful, since this will allow us, when studying whether a poverty measure satis…es Robustness to Mortality Changes or not, to focus on the hypothetical case where there is no income mobility, and to check whether No Mobility Same Poverty is satis…ed or not. If the poverty rate is not, in the absence of mobility, constant along the lifecycle, this implies that Robustness to Mortality Changes is necessarily violated.
As it is shown below, the old-age poverty rate P 2 does not satisfy the Robustness to Mortality Changes condition. The old-age poverty rate is subject to the interferences induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality.
Proposition 1 P 2 does not satisfy No Mobility Same Poverty. We have, without income mobility:
Proof. See the Appendix. Hence, as a consequence of the above Lemma, we know that the old-age poverty rate violates also the Robustness to Mortality Changes, and, thus, is not robust to a deterioration of the survival conditions faced by the poor. The old-age poverty rate P 2 is thus subject to the Mortality Paradox.
A general solution to the Mortality Paradox
The reason why poverty measures su¤er from the Mortality Paradox has to do with the fact that, once dead, poor persons disappear from the population. Therefore, as suggested by Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007) , a solution to the Mortality Paradox comes from the extension of lifetime income pro…les, to take into account the persons subject to premature mortality. The underlying idea is the following. Instead of computing old-age poverty measures on the basis of the surviving persons only, one should do as if all individuals are still alive at the old age, and bene…t from some income. For that purpose, lifetime income pro…les must be extended, to assign some income to prematurely dead persons.
The assignment of a …ctitious income to the premature dead implies that we have now two, instead of one, income transition matrices: one for individuals who survived to the old age, i.e. , and one for those who did not survive. We will denote that latter income transition matrix by , of size K K: :::
K1
::: :::
where ij is the probability, for an individual with income y i when being young, to have a …ctitious income e i = y j assigned to him when he is dead. The adjusted old-age poverty rate, denoted byP 2 , can be written as:
The …rst term of the numerator is standard: it counts the poor individuals among the old (surviving) population. But the second term is less standard: it counts the poor individuals among those who did not survive, their …ctitious incomes being assigned to them through the matrix . The adjusted poverty rateP 2 can take distinct forms, depending on: (1) whether the assignment of …ctitious incomes concerns all individuals or only the initially poor; (2) whether …ctitious incomes exceed or are below the poverty line y P . Those two features of the extension are captured by the matrix .
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The next proposition examines the conditions on under whichP 2 avoids the Mortality Paradox. As above, we rely here on the No Mobility Same Poverty (i.e. NMSP), since we know, by our lemma, that a violation of that property leads to a violation of Robustness to Mortality Changes.
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Proposition 2 I: A …ctitious income e i is assigned to the dead poor only.
-Ia: If e i < y P for all i,P 2 satis…es NMSP:P 2 = P 1 . -Ib: If e i < y P for i < R P and e i y P for i R,P 2 does not satisfy NMSP:P 2 < P 1 . -Ic: If e i y P for all i,P 2 does not satisfy NMSP:P 2 < P 1 . II: A …ctitious income e i is assigned to all dead individuals. -IIa: If e i < y P for all i,P 2 does not satisfy NMSP:P 2 > P 1 . -IIb: If e i < y P for i < R P and e i y P for i R,P 2 does not satisfy NMSP:P 2 ? P 1 . -IIc: If e i y P for all i,P 2 does not satisfy NMSP:P 2 < P 1 .
Proof. See the Appendix. When …ctitious incomes are assigned only to the prematurely dead poor persons, and when all …ctitious incomes are lower than the poverty line,P 2 satis…es the No Mobility Same Poverty, and, thus, satis…es some weak form of independence with respect to survival conditions. That case -case Ia -is quite speci…c, and -even slight -departures from this will generally imply a lack of robustness of the old-age poverty rate to changes in survival conditions. Indeed, in all cases except Ia, the NMSP is violated, implying, by our Lemma, a violation of the Robustness to Mortality Changes. Two kinds of sensitivity can arise, and these do not have the same relationship with the Mortality Paradox.
On the one hand, if the …ctitious income exceeds the poverty threshold (i.e. cases Ib, Ic, IIc), the old-age poverty rate does not satisfy Robustness to Mortality Changes, and is subject to the Mortality Paradox. In that case,P 2 is, despite the adjustment, lower than P 1 , since only a subgroup of the prematurely dead poor persons are counted as poor in the adjusted measure.
On the other hand, if …ctitious incomes are assigned to all prematurely dead persons (i.e. cases IIa),P 2 is not invariant to mortality changes.P 2 is then higher than the poverty rate at the young age, because we count all prematurely dead persons as poor. Hence the Mortality Paradox does not hold here. It is quite the opposite, sinceP 2 does not only count the "missing" poor, but counts also premature death as a part of the poverty phenomenon to be measured. 12 Finally, let us notice a special case where the two reasons whyP 2 violates No Mobility Same Poverty go in opposite directions. It can be shown that, under particular circumstances, those reasons cancel each other, makingP 2 satisfy No Mobility Same Poverty. 13 1 1 We assume, for the simplicity of presentation, that the poverty line y P is invariant to the adjustment. Alternatively, if one considers a relativistic view of poverty, it could be argued that the adjustment a¤ects also the poverty line. Given that this second-order e¤ect depends on the precise way in which the poverty line is computed, we leave that discussion to the empirical example of Section 4.
1 2 We will come back on that extension -and its justi…cations -below. 1 3 That special case includes the situation where the matrix assigning …ctitious incomes, i.e. , coincides with the income mobility matrix . Indeed, in that case, we have:
It is easy to check that this adjusted poverty rate satis…es No Mobility Same Poverty.
Corollary 1 When (1) a …ctitious income is assigned to all prematurely dead persons; (2) the …ctitious income is inferior to y P for all short-lived poor individuals, and is superior to y P for all short-lived non-poor individuals,P 2 satis…es No Mobility Same Poverty. That case coincides with case IIb with R = P .
In sum, this section shows that it is possible to achieve some weak independence with respect to survival conditions -under the form of No Mobility Same Poverty -by extending the lifetime income pro…les of the prematurely dead. That extension can be done in various ways, but it should concern either only the prematurely dead poor individuals, with …ctitious incomes below the poverty threshold, or every prematurely dead, but with …ctitious incomes below the poverty line only for prematurely dead poor individuals. Otherwise, the No Mobility Same Poverty condition will be violated.
Finally, it should be stressed here that the solution proposed by Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007) , which coincides with case Ia, satis…es No Mobility Same Poverty. That property captures some aspect of independence of poverty measures with respect to survival conditions. However, it should be noticed that, as stated in Lemma 1, No Mobility Same Poverty does not guarantee, in a general context with income mobility, Robustness to Mortality Changes. Hence, the solution to the Mortality Paradox that is proposed by Kanbur and Mukherjee seems to presuppose the absence of income mobility.
The extension of income pro…les revisited
The previous section identi…ed conditions under which truncating income pro…les of the dead makes poverty measures avoid the Mortality Paradox. That solution, although appealing, faces some criticisms, which concern both the selection and meaningfulness of the …ctitious incomes used in the extension.
A …rst criticism is that, even if one sticks to the extension described above, there exist not a single, but numerous ways to truncate the lifetime income pro…les of the prematurely dead. The problem is that the resulting poverty estimates are likely to be strongly sensitive to the chosen …ctitious income e i . The closer e i is to y P , the lower the measured poverty is. Hence, the measurement of poverty in real environments requires more precise information. 14 A second criticism concerns the extent to which premature mortality per se matters for poverty measurement. Once lifetime income pro…les are extended, the …ctitious income enters the poverty measure as if it was an income enjoyed by a living person. This amounts to regard as equivalent two situations that are quite di¤erent: on the one hand, being alive with some income y i , and, on the other hand, being dead with a …ctitious income e i equal to y i . Hence the extension of lifetime income pro…les has a double e¤ect. This does not only allow to count some -otherwise missing -poor in the measure of poverty. The 1 4 That critique applies not only to the extension discussed above, but, also, to what was proposed by Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007) . According to them, the …ctitious income has to satisfy three properties: (1) it is increasing in the past income (i.e. y i > y i 1 =) e i > e i 1 ); (2) it cannot exceed the past income (i.e. e i y i ); (3) agents who are not poor when being alive should not be counted as poor after the extension (i.e. e i y P when y i > y P ). Those conditions imply that the poverty measure falls under case Ia, and escapes from the Mortality Paradox. However, those conditions are too general for measurement exercises. extension assigns also some weights to two dimensions of poverty (income and longevity). Such a weighting exercise cannot remain implicit, but should have some explicit (welfare) foundations.
Those two criticisms invite a method to select a particular …ctitious income, and to solve the trade-o¤s, in terms of poverty measurement, between low incomes and short lives. This is the task of the present section.
A welfare-neutral …ctitious income
To overcome those two criticisms, we propose here to carry out the computation of …ctitious incomes on the basis of individual preferences on lifetime income pro…les. More precisely, we propose to solve those problems by selecting a particular …ctitious income: the welfare-neutral income. This is de…ned as the hypothetical income that would make an individual indi¤erent between, on the one hand, further life with that income, and, on the other hand, death.
The reliance on individual preferences requires some justi…cations. Actually, the Mortality Paradox is a paradox only to the extent that premature death is a part of the poverty phenomenon to be measured. If premature death had nothing to do with poverty, then there would be nothing paradoxical in having poverty measures decreasing once survival conditions deteriorate. But the will to overcome the Mortality Paradox pushes us de facto in the …eld of multidimensional poverty measurement. Hence, it is hard to ignore individual preferences as providing an adequate informational basis for weighting the two dimensions of poverty (income and longevity). Indeed, if the level of the …ctitious income contributes to assign a speci…c "weight" re ‡ecting the contribution of premature death to poverty, then using individual preferences is the natural way to solve that weighting exercise.
To de…ne that welfare-neutral income, let us assume that individuals have well-de…ned preferences over all possible lifetime income pro…les, and that those preferences can be represented by a non-decreasing function U ( ):
where u t i is the value assigned by a state-dependent temporal utility function at period t under temporal income y i :
if the individual is not alive at that period (11) where u( ) is increasing, while is the utility of being dead.
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On the basis of that, one can de…ne the "welfare-neutral" income as follows.
De…nition 2 For an individual with income y i 2 Y with premature death, the welfare-neutral income y i is the hypothetical income that makes him indi¤ erent between life continuation and death:
1 5 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that preferences are uniform. 1 6 That number is, in most applications, set to zero (see below).
Note that whether the welfare-neutral income y i is higher or lower than the income when alive y i is an open issue. The answer depends on the individual's preferences (i.e. the shape of the functions U ( ) and u ( )), and on how poor he was when alive (i.e. y i enjoyed at the young age).
Having de…ned the welfare-neutral income y i , let us now explain why it is a plausible candidate for the extension of lifetime income pro…les of the prematurely dead. For that purpose, we will show how the welfare-neutral income provides a solution to the two criticisms formulated above, by considering the welfare consequences of the extension of lifetime income pro…les.
Actually, when one truncates an agent's income pro…le (y i ; 0) with a …ctitious income e i , this amounts to do as if that person was still alive during that period, and enjoyed an income e i . Thus, the hypothetical situation after extension can be better or worse than the actual situation depending on whether:
If the RHS exceeds the LHS, the person would have preferred living one more period with the …ctitious income rather than dying after the young age. If the LHS exceeds the RHS, the person thinks that his actual life is better than the same life with the addition of one period with income e i . In the former case, the extension of the income pro…le amounts to do as if the person had enjoyed a better life than the one he actually enjoyed. In the latter case, it is the opposite. But in any case, the extension disconnects the measurement of poverty from the measurement of welfare, which is problematic. To illustrate this, let us compare three cases.
Case A: an individual with income y i < y P dies after period 1, and no extension is made in the poverty measure.
Case B: an individual with income y i < y P dies after period 1, but his income pro…le is extended by means of the incomeẽ i < y P such that:
Case C: an individual with income y i < y P dies at the end of period 2, and enjoys the income y j =ẽ i < y P at the old age.
The measured poverty is lower in Case A than in Case B. The measured poverty is also lower in Case A than in Case C, since Case C is equivalent to Case B for the measurement of poverty. Hence we have: P 2A < P 2B = P 2C . In welfare terms, Cases A and B are equivalent, since these di¤er only in how poverty is measured, and are exactly the same otherwise. Case C dominates the other cases in welfare terms (because of the above inequality). Thus we have:
Hence, the death of the individual, i.e. the passage from C to B, reduces his welfare, but does not change the measured poverty. This is quite problematic. Clearly, if a society undergoes an epidemy, so that many individuals shift from Case C to Case B, it is hard to claim, despite the fall in social welfare, that poverty is, at the end, the same as if the epidemic had not occurred. Such a claim is surely subject to the Mortality Paradox. The constancy of the measured poverty despite a change in living conditions is acceptable only if that change is welfare-neutral.
Actually, there exists only one level of the …ctitious income e i that avoids that problem. It is the "welfare-neutral" income y i . It is easy to see that, when e i = y i , there is no discrepancy between poverty measurement and welfare measurement. Indeed, if we now assume e i = y i , we still get that poverty is larger under Cases B and C than under Case A, i.e. P A < P B = P C . In welfare terms, we have that Cases A and B are still equivalent (since the only change concerns how poverty is measured), but that welfare in Case C is also equal to what it is in Case B, since, by de…nition, survival with the …ctitious income does not constitute a welfare improvement. Hence we have: U A = U B = U C . Thus, poverty is the same in B and C, and welfare too. Here there is nothing shocking in having a constant poverty measure despite the occurrence of an event such as an epidemic, since that event is here welfare-neutral, unlike what prevailed above. Here the comparison of Cases B and C consists of comparing the emergence of an epidemic with its avoidance at the cost of extreme misery (leading individuals to indi¤erence between life and death). Those two situations are equivalent in terms of poverty, and the Mortality Paradox does not arise.
In sum, the use of the welfare-neutral income as a …ctitious income allows us to base the extension on a speci…c …ctitious income, as well as to avoid a discrepancy between the measurement of poverty and the measurement of welfare. As such, this brings an appealing solution to the Mortality Paradox.
A speci…c case: time-additive welfare
The "welfare-neutral" …ctitious income y i depends on the postulated preferences, which can take various forms. However, under standard time-additive lifetime welfare, the welfare-neutral income y i has two convenient properties. On the one hand, it is unique; on the other hand, it is independent from past income.
To see this, let us assume that lifetime welfare takes a time-additive form:
where is a time preference factor (0 < < 1). Then, if the utility of death is normalized to zero (i.e. = 0), we have
Hence, the welfare-neutral income y i , is implicitly de…ned by:
An additional life-period with income larger than y i is worth being lived, whereas a life-period with income lower than y i is not. Under that speci…cation, the …ctitious income y i is such that temporal welfare is zero, that is, equivalent to the temporal welfare associated to death. Thus, in that case, the welfareneutral income y i is the same for all past income levels. In the rest of this section, we will denote it by y N . As a consequence, it appears that, under standard time-additive lifetime utility, the welfare-neutral income level is unique and independent from past incomes. Note that those properties way not hold under alternative, less standard, preferences. 17 1 7 To see this, take the following forms, which only regard either the worst or the best period
Properties of the new adjusted poverty measure
Let us now study whether adjusted poverty measures based on welfare-neutral …ctitious incomes are robust to changes in survival conditions. Remind that the adjusted old-age poverty rateP 2 is now computed by assigning a single valuei.e. the welfare-neutral …ctitious income -for the second-period income for all prematurely dead individuals.
As explained above, whether the welfare-neutral …ctitious income lies above or below the past income when alive depends on individual preferences, and on the past income level. Therefore the transition matrix can take various forms. Note, however, that, in the case of time-additive lifetime welfare, the welfareneutral income takes a single value, denoted by y N , which is independent from past incomes. Hence takes a simple form, where ij = 0 for j 6 = N and iN = 1 for all i, and the adjusted poverty rateP 2 can be written as:
In the former case, the prematurely dead persons are all counted as poor. In the latter case, they all disappear from the poverty measure. The interpretation of those two cases is as follows. When y N < y P , an individual enjoying an income equal to the poverty line still prefers that life to death, whereas, when y N y P , the poverty threshold is lower than the welfare-neutral income level, revealing that the misery makes life not worth being lived. To identify the conditions under which the so-constructed adjusted poverty measureP 2 is subject to the Mortality Paradox, we will, as above, examine whetherP 2 satis…es No Mobility Same Poverty (NMSP), since it is a simple way to see whetherP 2 is robust to changes in survival conditions.
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Proposition 3 Consider an economy with time-additive lifetime welfare.
Under y N < y P ,P 2 does not satisfy NMSP:P 2 > P 1 .
Under y N y P ,P 2 does not satisfy NMSP:P 2 < P 1 .
Proof. See the Appendix. Thus, once the …ctitious income takes its welfare-neutral level and is assigned to all prematurely dead individuals, the adjusted poverty rate does not satisfy Under the min speci…cation, y i is such that u( y i ) u 1 i , which implies y i y i , but does not allow us to say more. On the contrary, under the max speci…cation, we have y i y i . Thus the uniqueness and the independence of the welfare-neutral income from past income are not general properties, but only nice corollaries of standard time-additive lifetime welfare. 1 8 As above, we assume here that the poverty line y P is invariant to the adjustment made (see Section 4 on this).
No Mobility Same Poverty, and, by the above lemma, also violates Robustness to Mortality Changes. That lack of robustness occurs, since the extension based on the welfare-neutral …ctitious income amounts to count early deaths as a source of the poverty phenomenon to be measured. The sensitivity of adjusted poverty measure to survival conditions has two meanings.
When y N lies below the poverty threshold y P , all premature deaths are regarded as a source of poverty, and this explains whyP 2 is sensitive to a deterioration of survival conditions. Thus, adjusted poverty measures, instead of being invariant to changes in income-based mortality, take di¤erential mortality into account, in the opposite way as standard poverty measures do. This explains whyP 2 violates the Robustness to Mortality Changes in that case. If, on the contrary, the welfare-neutral income level exceeds the poverty threshold, the adjusted poverty measure at the old age is lower than the poverty measure at the young age. The intuition is that, in that case, life is not worth being lived for all poor persons. As a consequence, in that context, premature death cannot be counted as something causing poverty, and the Mortality Paradox is hardly relevant under those circumstances.
In sum, this Section proposed to overcome the Mortality Paradox by truncating lifetime income pro…les of the prematurely dead by means of the welfareneutral income. The use of the welfare-neutral income as a …ctitious income can be defended on two grounds. First, the computation of an income that yields indi¤erence between life and death leads, under standard preferences, to a unique value for the …ctitious income. Such a uniqueness is most welcome when we consider the empirical measurement of poverty, which is strongly sensitive to the …ctitious income (see below). Second, the so-computed …ctitious income can also, thanks to its welfarist foundations, sort out trade-o¤s between income and longevity. As such, this adjustment of poverty measures does more than counting the "missing" individuals; it also takes into account a "hidden" -but central -part of the poverty phenomenon to be measured: premature death.
Old-age poverty in Belgian regions
Let us now illustrate the downward bias due to the Mortality Paradox, and the sensitivity of adjusted old-age poverty measures to the extension of income pro…les. For those purposes, we will use data from Belgium and its regions.
The data
We use raw poverty measures coming from the European household survey EU-SILC for the year 2006 (EU, 2006) . Regarding longevity data, the empirical study of the Mortality Paradox ideally requires lifetables di¤erentiated according to income groups. Such lifetables are not available, but these are derived from education-speci…c lifetables from Deboosere et al. (2009). on the measurement of poverty in the population aged 60 or more. Table 1 presents the head-count poverty rates by region and by age groups in 2006.
Poverty is higher among those of age 60 and more than among the total population. While the total poverty rate is 14.2 %, the proportion of poor elderly is 20.8 %. There exist also large di¤erences between men and women. Whatever the region and the age group are, poverty rates are larger among women than among men. That gender poverty gap is particularly high above the age of 60. Table 1 highlights also a big di¤erence between Flanders and Wallonia. That gap is important among the younger generations, but tends to vanish at older age, thanks to the (nationwide) pension system. Table 1 also shows life expectancy di¤erentials between men and women, and between Flanders and Wallonia. Whereas the gender gap in life expectancy is well documented, the geographical gap is more surprising. Indeed, although both regions are geographically close to each other, life expectancy at birth in Wallonia is shorter than in Flanders, by about 2 years and a half. Besides gender and geographic location, another source of longevity inequality is the income. However, the impact of income on mortality is more di¢ cult to observe, since there exist no income-speci…c lifetable. Hence, in order to derive a relation between income and mortality, we use lifetables by educational level, which are regularly published, and the correlations between education and income, to extrapolate lifetables by income levels, for each region and gender.
While our calculations are presented in the Appendix, Figures 1 and 2 below summarize our results by showing life expectancy at age 55-59 by income class, for males and females in Flanders and in Wallonia.
Those …gures invite several comments. First, there exists an increasing monotonic relationship between income and life expectancy at age 55-59. That relationship is robust to all genders and regions, and is signi…cant. For instance, a Walloon man in the lowest income class has a life expectancy that is 4 years less than the one of a Walloon man of the highest income group. Second, the income / longevity relationship is non-linear: it is between the second and the sixth deciles that the slope is the largest. But at the two extremes of the income distribution, the income / longevity relationship is less strong. Thirdly, the comparison of Figures 1 and 2 suggests that the income / longevity relationship is signi…cantly stronger for men than for women.
In the light of Figures 1 and 2 , one can expect that standard poverty measures at high ages are biased downwards. The reasons are twofold. A …rst reason has to do with the selection mechanism induced by incomedi¤erentiated mortality. Given that poor persons tend to live less long than non-poor persons, the poverty rate among the surviving population at age 60 and more re ‡ects not only the "true" poverty, but, also, the interferences associated with the di¤erentiated survival process. That noise tends to reduce the apparent poverty, by the mere absence of the "missing" poor. Hence the poverty rate among Walloon males, equal to 20.4 %, tends, by being based on the population surviving to age 60, to forget the "missing" poor, who faced worse survival conditions than the average because of their poverty.
Besides that measurement problem -i.e. the Mortality Paradox -, one may also argue that a premature death is a part of the poverty phenomenon to be measured. Once it is acknowledged that a Walloon male of the lowest income class lives, on average, 4 years less than one of the highest income class, why should we restrict the measurement of poverty to the income dimension?
Those problems invite distinct adjustments of poverty measures. This section compares adjusted old-age poverty measures obtained by truncating the income pro…les of the prematurely dead, under various extension techniques.
General methodology
The adjustment of poverty measures includes two parts. First, the addition of the "missing" poor; second, the imputation of a particular …ctitious income.
Regarding the …rst step, we use the following method. For each income class i and region r = F; W , we have increased the population group N ir on the basis of the largest life expectancy observed (i.e. the one of top income levels in Flanders). After correction, the adjusted population group is:
whereN ir is the adjusted population group, N ir is the raw population group, L 100F is the life expectancy of the top income group in Flanders, and L ir is the life expectancy for income group i in region r. The above computation gives us a new distribution of the population in terms of income, which is the income distribution in the hypothetical case where all individuals had faced the same survival conditions as the ones of a group of reference (top earnings in Flanders). That computation allows us to reintegrate, in our calculations, the missing persons, equal, for each group, toN ir N ir .
Under such a computation, the …ctitious income assigned to a prematurely dead individual coincides with his past income. As we discussed above, that extension technique, although attractive, is not the unique possible one. It is indeed possible to reallocate the missing personsN ir N ir of each group i and region r to any income group, and, in particular, to the welfare-neutral income group. Hence, in the following, we present adjusted poverty measures under those two adjustment techniques. 21 The …rst extension technique (left side of Figure 3) , where missing persons are reallocated to the income group corresponding to their income when being alive; the second extension technique (right side of Figure 3) , where all missing persons are reallocated to the welfareneutral income group y N . 
Results
Let us …rst consider the simple case where the …ctitious income e i used for the extension is the one enjoyed when being alive, i.e. y i . For that purpose, we will proceed in two stages. We will …rst compute the poverty rate for age 60 and more for each gender and region, for the new population computed above, while assuming that the poverty threshold takes the same level as before the adjustment. Then, we will compute adjusted poverty rates under a new poverty line (taking the modi…cation of the income distribution into account). Table 2 shows that, if one keeps the poverty threshold of Table 1 , adjusted poverty rates are larger than standard poverty rates. That result is not surprising: our correction, by adding the "missing" persons, consists in adding relatively more poor individuals than non-poor individuals. Hence, under a …xed poverty threshold, there must be a rise in the poverty rate. That adjustment is relatively constant across genders and regions, and equal to about 1 point. Such an adjustment, which can be interpreted as the downward bias due to the Mortality Paradox, may be regarded as either low or high. On the one hand, when one considers poverty rates of about 20%, the addition of one point is a minor adjustment. On the other hand, that adjustment looks signi…cant once we think that 1 percent of the population under study consists of thousands of persons and families.
Whereas the …rst part of Table 2 is based on the pre-adjustment poverty threshold, the modi…cation of the population groups in such a way as to neutralize the impact of di¤erential mortality has also the e¤ect of changing the income distribution as a whole. Hence, if one adheres to a relativist -rather than absolutist -view of poverty, the addition of "missing" individuals may also a¤ect the level of the poverty threshold. If one computes that new threshold, we obtain a poverty line that is 125 euros lower than the initial one. Under that new threshold, poverty rates tend to fall to levels that are close (if not inferior) to unadjusted poverty rates (second part of Table 2 ). Thus, if one adheres to a relativist view of poverty, taking the "missing" individuals into account may reduce -rather than raise -poverty. Therefore, whether counting the "missing" persons a¤ects the measured poverty or not depends on whether we adhere to an absolutist or a relativistic view of poverty. In the former case, adding the prematurely dead raises poverty. In the latter case, the fall in the poverty threshold is such that the poverty rate is close -if not lower -than before the adjustment. Those results raise the question of the "right" poverty threshold. We will not address that general issue here, and we will propose poverty measures under the two kinds of threshold.
Whereas Table 2 presupposed that the …ctitious income equals the income when being alive, one can consider other values for that …ctitious income. As discussed above, a natural candidate is the welfare-neutral income. That welfareneutral income is not easy to estimate. As a starting point, we will consider the case where the welfare-neutral income equals zero, implying that death is, from a welfare perspective, equivalent to a life with zero income.
As shown in Table 3 , setting the …ctitious income to zero leads to much larger poverty rates, whatever the gender and the region under study. That result is robust to whether we keep a given poverty threshold, or whether we adjust it as a result of the modi…cation of the income distribution. When comparing Table  3 with Table 2 , it appears that the adjusted poverty measures are sensitive to the …ctitious income assigned to prematurely dead individuals. Assuming that the welfare-neutral income is equal to zero should only be regarded as a …rst approximation. Actually, the recent literature on the measurement of welfare losses induced by premature death allows us to derive more precise estimates of the welfare-neutral income. For that purpose, let us assume, like Becker et al. (2005) , that agents have the temporal utility function: Following Becker et al. (2005) , we …x = 1:25. We estimate the intercept on the basis of the average income in our database, and we obtain: = 15:50. On the basis of those estimates, we obtain a welfare-neutral income equal to 284 euros. Table 4 shows adjusted poverty rates under that …ctitious income.
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Adjusted poverty rates under the welfare-neutral …ctitious income are larger than under …ctitious incomes equal to the income when being alive, and, also, larger than unadjusted poverty measures. It is also important to decompose the adjustment into (1) counting the "missing poor"; (2) counting premature death as a part of poverty. The …rst adjustment explains the gap between poverty rates in Tables 1 and 2 . That change is small -about 1 point -and not robust to the chosen poverty threshold. The second adjustment explains the poverty di¤erentials between Tables 2 and 4. That di¤erential is large -about 6-7 points -and quite robust to the chosen poverty threshold.
Another important observation to be made concerns the gender poverty gap. In unadjusted terms, Walloon women are poorer than Walloon men (21.6 % against 18.9 %). In adjusted terms, and taking past incomes as a basis for the …ctitious income, women are still more poor than men (22.3 % against 20.1 %). However, once we count premature death as a part of poverty, we obtain the opposite ranking: Walloon men, because of their worse survival conditions, turn out to be poorer than Walloon women (31.9 % against 29.4 %). Hence, the choice of …ctitious incomes is relevant not only for the description of aggregate outcomes, but, also, for the description of poverty di¤erentials between groups. 
Conclusions
Under income-di¤erentiated mortality, poverty measures re ‡ect not only the "true" poverty, but, also, the interferences due to the survival process. That dependency on survival laws leads to the Mortality Paradox: the worse the survival conditions of the poor are, the lower the measured poverty is. We proposed to re-examine a solution to that paradox, which consists of extending lifetime income pro…les, to take the "missing poor" into account. For that purpose, we developed a two-period model with income mobility and income-di¤erentiated mortality. We identi…ed two conditions under which the extension of income pro…les satis…es a weak requirement of independence from survival conditions (No Mobility Same Poverty): (1) the …ctitious income is assigned only to the prematurely dead poor; (2) that …ctitious income does not exceed the income when being alive.
Although those conditions are intuitive, these su¤er from two major drawbacks. First, condition (1) is not compatible with the idea that a premature death is a source of poverty for all individuals who face it. Second, condition (2) does not help us a lot regarding the choice of a particular …ctitious income, which is problematic for empirical applications. Therefore, we proposed to extend the adjustment to all prematurely dead persons, and to use, as a …ctitious income, the welfare-neutral income, i.e. the income making an individual indi¤erent between life continuation and death.
Finally, we used regional Belgian data to estimate the size of the Mortality Paradox, as well as the robustness of adjusted poverty measures to the …ctitious incomes used. We showed that the extension of income pro…les by means of …ctitious incomes equal to the incomes when being alive leads to a rise of about 1 point of poverty rate at age 60 and more. But once the poverty threshold is modi…ed to …t the adjusted income distribution, the adjusted poverty rate becomes close to the unadjusted one. We also compute adjusted poverty rates under welfare-neutral …ctitious incomes, and showed that such an alternative adjustment raises poverty rates by about 6 to 7 points. Hence, while the mere addition of the "missing" poor under a constant income leads to a minor variation in the magnitude of poverty, the monetization of premature death by means of the welfare-neutral …ctitious income raises the magnitude of poverty.
Those …ndings have strong corollaries in terms of policy-making. Suppose that a government can choose between two policies: on the one hand, a transfer program towards the elderly poor; on the other hand, a free access to health care services below some income level. Undoubtedly, the …rst policy would reduce the standard old-age poverty rate, but the second policy, by increasing the number of poor persons surviving to the old age, would raise the old-age poverty measure. Relying on standard poverty measures would thus favor the …rst policy. On the contrary, if one uses adjusted old-age poverty measures, the …rst policy, by focusing on the surviving old, would only reduce poverty to a small extent, whereas the second policy, by preventing lots of premature deaths, would strongly reduce the (so-measured) poverty. Thus the precise way in which poverty is measured is far from neutral regarding the assessment of social policies.
In sum, the comparison of standard poverty rates with adjusted ones reveals that the impact of income-di¤erentiated mortality on the measurement of poverty is far from benign. One should thus be careful when interpreting the levels and variations of usual old-age poverty measures. Those measures hide not only a large number of "missing" poor, but, also, a strong form of deprivation: premature death. Thus, two centuries after Malthus'treatise, a particular attention should still be paid to the positive population checks at work in our economies. Otherwise, if we do as if positive checks do not exist, social statistics -including the ones on poverty -will be hardly useful for policy-makers.
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Proof of Proposition 1
By Lemma 1, we can prove that proposition by merely showing that the old-age poverty rate violates No Mobility Same Poverty. No Mobility Same Poverty requires that, if no mobility, i.e. ii = 1 for all i, poverty at the young age and at the old age should be the same. In the absence of mobility, P 2 is:
Given 1 < ::: < K , this cannot be equal to
Actually, in P 2 , low income group numbers receive lower weights than under P 1 (where the weights are unitary). Hence, it is easy to see that: P 2 < P 1 , which goes against No Mobility Same Poverty. By Lemma 1, we also know that P 2 does not satisfy Robustness to Mortality Changes.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider …rst the case where only the initially poor who died prematurely are assigned a …ctitious income. In that case, we have:
If e i < y P for all i:
In the absence of income mobility among those who are alive, this can be rewritten as:
If e i < y P for all i < R P and e i y P for all i R:
In the absence of income mobility, this can be rewritten as:
Hence No Mobility Same Poverty is not satis…ed here.
If e i y P for all i:P
Thus the adjusted poverty measure does not satisfy No Mobility Same Poverty.
Let us now consider the case where a …ctitious income level is assigned to all premature dead persons. We have the following three cases: If e i < y P for all i:
ThusP 2 > P 1 , because the premature deaths who used to be rich are now counted as poor. However, when i ! 1 for e i > y P , we have:
Hence under a low mortality of the non-poor, the adjusted poverty rate is close to satisfy Non Mobility Same Poverty.
Hence without income mobility, we have:
Thus No Mobility Same Poverty is not satis…ed.
Proof of Corollary 1
Indeed, in that case, we have:
Hence, in the absence of income mobility, we have:
in conformity with No Mobility Same Poverty.
Proof of Proposition 3
Under y N < y P , we have:
In the absence of mobility, this can be rewritten as:
k ThusP 2 > P 1 , because the premature deaths who used to be rich are now counted as poor.
Under y N y P , we have:
Without income mobility, this becomes:
Poverty measures Poverty rates are obtained on the basis of the income data from the european survey EU-SILC. Individuals are taken as the unit of analysis. The income level assigned to each individual is computed by dividing the household income level by an equivalence scale. The equivalence scale that is used is the one of the OECD. That scale assigns a weight of 1 for the …rst adult in the household, a weight of 0.5 for other adults of (14 years or more) in the household, and a weight of 0.3 for household members less than 14 years-old.
The poverty rate gives the percentage of the population that does not enjoy an available equivalent income at least equal to 60 % of the median available equivalent income (median income computed for the country as a whole).
Life tables by income class There are no lifetable by income in Belgium. However, there exist lifetables by education levels (Deboosere et al, 2009) . From these tables, it is possible to estimate lifetables by income class using a weighted ordinary least square regression, as in Bossuyt et al (2004) and Van Oyen et al (2005) studies on health expectancy. Indeed, the position in the social hierarchy is mainly determined by the dimensions: occupation, income and education. Given that the income and education are highly related to one another, we can extrapolate mortality by income class on the basis of the mortality by education. The social position is determined by the educational attainment. A …ve-category classi…cation is used: (1) no formal education; (2) primary education; (3) lower secondary education; (4) higher secondary education; (5) tertiary education. We assume that the position of a socio-economic group is determined by its relative position, de…ned as the mid-point of the proportion of group represents on an ordered scale of 100% (Pamuk, 1985 (Pamuk, , 1988 .
The mortality rates of the educational groups in terms of their relative socioeconomic position is estimated using a weighted ordinary least square region of each region and sex and (5-year) age group using aggregate data. The weights are de…ned as the relative sizes of the educational levels in each age group. The slope of the regression line represents the di¤erence in mortality between the bottom and the top of the socio-economic hierarchy. Once estimated, the coe¢ cient is used to compute lifetable according to income by assuming that the social hierarchy is similar to education.
In our case, we used lifetables by age groups of …ve years in order to obtain su¢ cient subsample of each income class. Indeed, we consider one hundred di¤erent groups. Each income class is of 500e except for the highest class which comprehend all income above 50000e.
